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निकंट पूर्व दिस्मा श्रीया विश्लेषण कार्यालय ادارة التحليل لشؤون الشرق الاوسط و جنوب آسيا המחלקה לענייני המזרח התיכון ודרום אפיה اداره تجزيه و تحليل خاور ميانه و جنوب آسيا Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis Directorate of Intelligence

NOTE FOR: James B. Kelly

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa,

the Near East and South Asia

· Department of Commerce

Attached is the paper on the Indian economy that you requested for Secretary Baldrige's briefing book. If you have any questions or if there is anything else we can do for you in preparation for the Secretary's trip to India, please call Chief, Subcontinent Branch

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10 April 1985

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INDIAN ECONOMY -- STRUCTURE AND TRENDS

| Sluggish Growth | | | ı |
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| India's gross national proly since the mid-1960s. With pocapita GNP has grown only slow world. Moreover, the economy is in agricultural and industrial | opulation growing about ly, and at \$240 remains s still vulnerable to wi | one of the lowest in the | 1 |
| Despite the vagaries of we third of GNP and employs more impressive gains. Modern farm ated the Green Revolution in fo creased purchases of manufactur | than two-thirds of the li ing practices and expand codgrain pr <u>oduction w</u> hil | abor force has shown ed irrigation have gener- e providing income for in- | X1 |
| Another success story has idly since 1982 with the exploition in India's net oil import billion, the lowest since 1979 creased. | itation of offshore field bill brought the total | trade deficit down to \$5 | X1 |
| Manufacturing output has a decade. Electric power shortage tant constraint on production. maintained and obsolete, partly inefficient producers and preventations and cumbersome bureauces sector corporations. | ges sometimes weather Much manufacturing capa y because government reguented large private firm | related are an impor- acity is underused, poorly ulations have protected s from expanding. Over- | l |
| Economic Policy Tools | | | |
| Since independence, Indiar conflicting objectives of econor pervasive government role. Alto been eased since 1980, many direction, production, and investment must direct a large share of the government. Government support finances as much as 40 percent financial institutions hold mor private corporations but have cosions. | omic growth, equity, and though restrictions on the rect controls on imports at remain. Most banks have a loans to priority set through loans, share puriof the cost of large priority and the cost of the econly rarely intervened in | self-reliance through a ne private sector have and on industrial loca-ave been nationalized and ectors specified by the urchases, and underwriting livate projects. Official quity of several hundred their business deci- | 1 |
| Other policy tools include than 45 percent of total invest central and state government in imports and dominate production and steel. | ment, and tax and monetanstitutions handle almost | ary policy. Meanwhile, t 60 percent of India's | 25 X 1 |
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| rivate Industry | |
| The private sector is led by large industrial conglomerates. Many of them such as the Tata and Birla groups are still associated with their founding amilies, although shares are now widely owned. Western management techniques be spreading, but some of the most aggressive industrial houses are still run an Indian style emphasis on constant growth and on cash generation rather can profits; the top family official exercises almost total authority by monitaring a cash flow budget. | Χ' |
| Small factories and households are responsible for roughly 40 percent of adian manufacturing. Government regulations reserve several hundred items for roduction exclusively by small-scale industries and provide them with tax and redit concessions. During the past decade, 'ancillaries' small units that 25% roduce parts for other manufacturers have been booming. | (1 |
| Government controls and high tax rates have generated a large 'black econo-y' unreported transactions that sustain production as well as luxury conumption. Rajiv Gandhi is campaigning against corruption, but also hopes to egitimize much of the ''black economy'' by reducing controls. | 1 |
| Business leaders have relatively easy access to economic policymakers arough private contacts and meetings sponsored by business organizations such the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. They have had apput on specific measures but have not, in general, had much influence on the overnment's overall economic strategy. | X 1 |
| More than 500 industrial establishments have research units, but on average new spend less than one percent of their sales proceeds on research, compared ith 3.7 percent for US companies. The rapidly growing electronics, telecommutications and motor vehicle industries still rely heavily on imported technoloties and on imports of key components. The number of cooperation agreements approved between Indian and foreign business firms has grown since the easing of controls in 1980 to 740 last year and will probably increase in response to Rative Gandhi's push for assimilation of advanced technology. Most research is conducted by the government and is devoted heavily to agriculture, defense, and tomic energy. | X 1 |
| Balance-of-Payments | |
| International transactions are a relatively small but critical part of the ast Indian economy. India's foreign trade policy emphasizes export promotion as ell as import substitution. | (1 |
| Imports about 10 percent of GNP provide an essential supplement to omestic production of petroleum, fertilizer, edible oils and, in some years, | |

Imports -- about 10 percent of GNP -- provide an essential supplement to domestic production of petroleum, fertilizer, edible oils and, in some years, foodgrains. The volume of general imports, including capital goods, has grown rapidly since controls were first eased in the late 1970s. Purchases of consum-

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| an anada athan than food and modificible. We simple country our | mlice mane them |
| er goods other than food are negligible. No single country sup 15 percent of non-military imports; the United States, the USSF | . - |
| Eastern oil exporters are major suppliers. New Delhi's defense | |
| heavily on Soviet equipment, in part because of the favorable of | |
| neavity on soviet equipment, in part because of the favorable t | redit terms. |
| Merchandise exports contribute only six percent of India's | s GNP. Agricultur- |
| al products and raw materials still account for about 30 percen | |
| ports, although New Delhi had some success in pushing sales of | |
| goods during the 1970s when Middle Eastern OPEC countries became | |
| ers. The volume of total exports stagnated in the early 1980s | |
| Indian manufacturers found the domestic market more profitable. | |
| USSR are India's principal markets, but other developing country | |
| of India's exports. | 25X1 |
| | |
| International financial reserves of \$6 billion are now ade | equate equiva- |
| lent to 4 to 5 months of merchandise imports largely because | |
| \$4.5 billion from the International Monetary Fund during the pa | st five years. |
| Concessional aid receipts have levelled off but still provide m | ore than \$2 bil- |
| lion a year, and New Delhi has turned increasingly to foreign b | orrowing on com- |
| mercial terms. Receipts from direct foreign investment remain | negligible. |
| Transfers and bank deposits from Indians resident in other coun | itries help to fi- |
| nance the trade deficit. | 25X1 |
| | |
| Prospects for Growth | |
| The Indian economy has sevenal important essets. Although | 65 nameont of |
| The Indian economy has several important assets. Although the adult population is illiterate, more than 30 million worker | |
| at least secondary education. The manufacturing sector one | |
| largest in the world is highly diversified, capable of produ | |
| most technically sophisticated goods, and will have new opportu | |
| liberalization of controls on private production and investment | |
| domestic savings 23 percent of GNP are high for a poor co | |
| domesore savings by persons of ant a are inglifier a poor of | 25X |
| At the same time, several factors point toward increasing | balance-of-pay- |
| ments strains within the next two years that could jeopardize I | |
| become more productive and efficient through liberalized import | |
| Scheduled payments to the IMF and military suppliers will mount | |
| | • |

At the same time, several factors point toward increasing balance-of-payments strains within the next two years that could jeopardize India's ability to become more productive and efficient through liberalized import restrictions. Scheduled payments to the IMF and military suppliers will mount sharply, and prospects for a reduction in the net petroleum import bill, rapid export growth, or increased foreign aid are poor. Expansion of the domestic economy would require an even faster growth in the volume of imported capital goods. Wary of falling into a debt trap, New Delhi will probably try to avoid a substantial increase in commercial borrowing to finance imports.

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